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Incomprehensible Discrimination
James Grimmelmann* & Daniel Westreich**
The following (fictional) opinion of the (fictional) Zootopia
Supreme Court of the (fictional) State of Zootopia is designed to
highlight one particularly interesting issue raised by Solon Barocas
and Andrew Selbst in Big Data’s Disparate Impact.1 Their article
discusses many ways in which data-intensive algorithmic methods can
go wrong when they are used to make employment and other sensitive
decisions. Our vignette deals with one in particular: the use of
algorithmically derived models that are both predictive of a legitimate
goal and have a disparate impact on some individuals. Like Barocas
and Selbst, we think it raises fundamental questions about how antidiscrimination law works and about what it ought to do. But we are
perhaps slightly more optimistic than they are that the law already has
the doctrinal tools it needs to deal appropriately with cases of this sort.
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After the statement of facts and procedural history, you will be
given a chance to pause and reflect on how the case ought to be
decided under existing United States law. Zootopia is south of East
Dakota and north of West Carolina. It is a generic law-school
hypothetical state, where federal statutes and caselaw apply, but
without distracting state-specific variations. The citations to articles,
statutes, regulations, and cases are real; RDL v. ZPD and Hopps v.
Lionheart are not.2 Otherwise, life in Zootopia is much like life here,
with one exception:
It is populated entirely by animals.
RUMINANT DEFENSE LEAGUE v. ZOOTOPIA POLICE DEPARTMENT
CHIEF JUSTICE UPDOG delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Zootopia Police Department (the ZPD) uses a mathematical
model to predict which applicants will be successful police officers. Four facts
about this model are undisputed. First, its scores are significantly correlated with
a reasonable measure of job performance. Second, the model does not explicitly
consider applicants’ species. Third, it nonetheless systematically favors
carnivorous applicants over herbivores. Fourth, no one has explained how and
why the model works at predicting job performance or how and why it
disadvantages herbivores. The question presented is whether the ZPD’s use of
such a model in making hiring decisions constitutes discrimination “on the basis
of . . . race” prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3
I.
The ZPD is the largest police department in the world and the tenth-largest
employer in Zootopia. Its name is synonymous with urban policing—and also,
unfortunately, with employment discrimination. The landmark Hopps v.
Lionheart litigation exposed a long tradition of intentional discrimination by
ZPD leadership in promoting carnivores over herbivores. It documented
numerous cases in which promotion decisions were based on blatant stereotypes,
such as that herbivores, accustomed to being prey, would be too “meek” and
“cowering” to serve effectively in leadership positions. Formal and informal

2. Readers may already have recognized “Zootopia” from the recent animated film of the same
name. ZOOTOPIA (Walt Disney Animation Studios 2016). In Zootopia, animals of all shapes and sizes
live side-by-side in imperfect harmony. Judy Hopps, the first rabbit officer to join the Zootopia Police
Department, is given forty-eight hours to solve a the case of a kidnapped otter. She enlists the reluctant
assistance of a small-time con-artist fox named Nick Wilde. Together, the two of them find that the otter
and thirteen other animals have been drugged with a serum that makes them revert to a feral state, then
track the scheme back to an unexpected source. We have borrowed Zootopia’s setting, a few of the
names, and its theme of irrational prejudice in employment discrimination—but that is as far as the
connection goes, and nothing in this essay should be regarded as reflecting any sponsorship, approval,
or endorsement on the filmmakers’ part.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(b) (2016).
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policies alike relegated herbivores to lower ranks and to lower-status
assignments, like parking enforcement. There was also abundant evidence of
anti-herbivore animus among the ZPD hierarchy, with herbivorous officers being
referred to dismissively by epithets such as “vegetable-huggers,” “lazy grazers,”
and “breakfast.” The plaintiffs argued that the ZPD’s policies constituted
forbidden discrimination “on the basis of . . . race.”
In Hopps, we held that Title VII applies to sentient talking anthropomorphic
animals as well as to humans, and that the term “race” as used in Title VII
includes an animal’s species. Although neither carnivores nor herbivores
constitute a “species” as such, we further held that discrimination on the basis of
an immutable species characteristic—such as diet—is discrimination “on the
basis of . . . race.”
Hopps resulted in a consent decree under which the ZPD agreed to make
promotion decisions strictly in accordance with a new composite measure of job
performance. This measure, the Bellwether Index (or BI), incorporates case
closure rates, numerical evaluations by supervisors, civilian complaints, and
performance on a standardized examination. Those elements were selected as
being broadly representative of the various responsibilities of ZPD officers while
also fairly recognizing the achievements of officers of all species. Although that
portion of the consent decree was lifted more than a decade ago, the ZPD
continues to rely substantially on BIs in making promotion decisions. That
practice is not at issue today.
Instead, the present suit challenges the ZPD’s decision-making process in
hiring new officers, where for obvious reasons BIs are not available. Two years
ago, in an effort to reduce the attrition rate from the famously rigorous ZPD
Academy and to improve the quality of its officer force, the ZPD used datamining techniques to rework its hiring processes.4 As described in the declaration
of Officer Benjamin Clawhauser, who oversaw the project, it comprised four
stages:
First, Clawhauser assembled an extensive set of training data consisting
of the ZPD’s nearly complete personnel files on all of its past and
present employees. These files contain thousands of items of
information, or factors, on each employee, including for example their
educational history, snack food preferences, credit score, best time in
the 100-meter dash, favorite song by the pop singer Gazelle, and home
address. We say “nearly complete” because Clawhauser stated that he
scrubbed all protected demographic characteristics—race, sex and
gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, country of origin, and
species —from the personnel files before using them as training data.
Second, Clawhauser selected a measurable target variable to serve as a
proxy for overall job performance. He chose the Bellwether Index
because experience under the consent decree and after had shown that it
4.

See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1 (describing data mining).
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was clearly defined, straightforward to extract from the ZPD’s
personnel files, and representative of ZPD officers’ various
responsibilities.
Third, Clawhauser used data-mining methods to extract algorithmically
a model of job performance based on the training data. The model is a
function whose inputs are the values of the factors for a particular
applicant, and whose output is a score (scaled from 0 to 250) predicting
that applicant’s Bellwether Index after five years of employment if he
or she were to be hired. The function is remarkably complex and the
significance of many of the factors it employs is obscure. For example,
the model predicts that given two applicants whose factors otherwise
match Clawhauser’s own, the applicant whose favorite Gazelle song is
“Try Everything” will have a BI that is 1.8 points higher than the BI of
the applicant who prefers another song.
Fourth, the ZPD began using the model’s scores to classify applicants
as “hire” or “do not hire.” The threshold has varied slightly, but initially,
applicants with a score of 120 or higher were hired; those with lower
scores were not.
In the five years immediately preceding the ZPD’s adoption of the new
process it had hired representatively diverse cohorts of new officers: the fraction
of herbivores among all officers hired was statistically close to the fraction of
herbivores among all applicants, and both were statistically close to the fraction
of herbivores among all inhabitants of Zootopia. Since the ZPD switched to
model-based hiring, it has hired almost exclusively carnivorous applicants.
Two years later, petitioner Ruminant Defense League (the “League”), on
behalf of its members, filed suit in the District Court for the District of Zootopia,
claiming that the ZPD’s use of the model to make hiring decisions violated Title
VII. In discovery, the ZPD produced the training data from which the model was
developed. The parties stipulated that the following subset is representative of
the entire set of training data. The “species” and “carnivore” columns are in
italics because the model does not explicitly take species into account. We
include it to illustrate the effect that use of the model has on carnivorous and
herbivorous applicants.

Amy
Bert
Charles
Denise

BI

Model Score

Species

Carnivore?

50
100
150
200

100
150
100
150

Antelope
Bear (Polar)
Capybara
Dingo

No
Yes
No
Yes

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the
ZPD’s motion. First, it held that because the model did not explicitly take species
into account, use of the model could not constitute disparate treatment of
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herbivores. Second, it held that even if use of the model had a disparate impact
on herbivores, the model’s predictive power made it legal as a business necessity.
It rejected the League’s argument that the model inherently discriminated against
herbivores because they consistently scored lower than carnivores.
Only these two holdings are before us, but we pause to note that in its
thorough opinion the District Court also rejected a number of other arguments
raised by the League, in each case on factual rather than legal grounds. In
particular, the ZPD offered insufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact
that the ZPD’s choice of BI as the target variable was intended to disadvantage
herbivores; that the ZPD’s choice of a threshold of 120 for its hire/no-hire
decisions had a more significant effect on herbivores than other possible choices,
or was intended to; that the training data in the ZPD’s personnel files was in any
way inaccurate; that the training data was insufficient to derive reliable
predictions about applicants or classes of applicants; that the training data
reflected any existing pattern of discrimination against or animus against
herbivores by others, such as civilians filing disciplinary complaints; that
herbivores were over- or under-represented in the training data; or that the choice
of features included in the training data had a more significant effect on
herbivores than other possible choices, or was intended to. These findings were
not challenged on appeal and so we take them as true for purposes of our opinion
today. The District Court expressed no opinion on whether such findings would
constitute a violation of Title VII in a case in which they were present, and
neither do we, other than to note that they involve cases in which the accuracy
of data-mined predictions would be undermined by discrimination rather than
apparently bound up with it. It is hard to see, for example, that an employer has
any legitimate interest (other than expedience) in using an inadequately small
training dataset. A better dataset would yield predictions that were both more
accurate and fairer. As such, we believe that these forms of potential bias pose
less fundamental challenges for anti-discrimination law than the present appeal
does; here, the goals of accuracy and fairness appear to be in tension.
The League appealed, arguing that on the undisputed facts, the ZPD’s use
of a biased model constituted disparate impact and disparate treatment as a
matter of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It first held that because the model
does not explicitly consider species and because the ZPD did not select or
employ the model with the purpose of discriminating against herbivores, use of
it cannot constitute disparate treatment. Turning to the League’s disparateimpact argument, the Court of Appeals held that the ZPD was justified in relying
on the model because it was predictive of job performance, notwithstanding its
disparate impact. More specifically, because the League had shown that use of
the model had a disparate impact on a protected class, the burden shifted to the
ZPD to show that use of the model qualified as a business necessity. The Court
of Appeals then held that ZPD carried this burden by showing an “undisputed
statistically and practically significant correlation between the model score and
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an undisputed measure of job performance,” shifting the burden back to the
League to show that an alternative employment practice would have had the
same predictive power with less discriminatory impact. In the Court of Appeals’
view, the League had not carried this burden: “We are sympathetic to the
League’s argument that it is being asked to improve on an algorithm it did not
create and does not understand. But without a concrete and less discriminatory
alternative, the League cannot be heard to say that the ZPD’s algorithm is
unnecessarily biased.” A dissenting judge would have held that use of a model
that “predictably and substantially disadvantages herbivores” constitutes
prohibited disparate impact, notwithstanding the model’s correlation with job
performance, and that even if the ZPD’s initial motivations were benign,
“knowingly continuing to use a biased model” constitutes prohibited disparate
treatment.
In view of the important issues presented by the case, we granted certiorari.
STOP.
The facts above present what Barocas and Selbst call the problem
of “proxies for proscribed criteria.”5 Barocas and Selbst argue that
current doctrine requires a result along the lines of the Court of
Appeals’. While they are normatively sympathetic to the dissent, they
believe it has little likelihood of becoming the law. In their view,
correcting for the disparate impact of a model in which a proxy is
correlated both with job performance and with a protected category
would require the kind of conscious rebalancing that the Supreme
Court has condemned as disparate treatment in Ricci v. Destefano.6
“At some point, society will be forced to acknowledge that this is really
a discussion about what constitutes a tolerable level of disparate
impact in employment,” they conclude. “Under the current
constitutional order and in the political climate, it is tough to even
imagine having such a conversation. But, until that happens, data
mining will be permitted to exacerbate existing inequalities in difficultto-counter ways.” 7 Are they right? Or is it possible to make at least
some progress in cases like RDL v. ZPD? How should the Zootopia
Supreme Court decide the case?

5. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1, at 693. See also Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven
Discrimination at Work, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801251 (discussing problem of proxies).
6. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
7. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1, at 728.
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II
In our view, the District Court and Court of Appeals failed to accord the
proper significance to the fact that no one—neither the League, nor the ZPD, nor
any of the capable judges who have heard this case—has been able to give a
satisfactory explanation of why the ZPD’s model both predicts job performance
and discriminates against herbivores, or of the relationship between these two
facts. The League is correct that the factors that the model identified correlate
with species, and the ZPD is correct that these factors also correlate with job
performance. The problem is that there is no explanation in the record as to which
of these two correlations, if either, is causal. It may be that the factors directly
measure applicant characteristics that determine success in the challenging and
dangerous field of police work, and that those characteristics happen to be
unequally distributed in our diverse society. It may also be that these factors are
instead measuring applicants’ species and that they measure likely job
performance only because they are identifying species in an applicant pool where
the relevant characteristics are unequally distributed. We believe that where a
plaintiff has identified a disparate impact, the defendant’s burden to show a
business necessity requires it to show not just that its model’s scores are not just
correlated with job performance but explain it. The Court of Appeals improperly
placed the consequences of ignorance about the model’s operation on the
League, instead of on the party best positioned to understand and control it, the
ZPD.
A
We begin by emphasizing that this is not a case about the choice of target
variable. The portion of our opinion in Hopps upholding the consent decree
against an objection by the Patrolrodents’ Benevolent Society stands for the
proposition that the ZPD may rely on BIs in making promotion decisions. There,
we held that the Bellwether Index is a facially neutral and generally accepted
measure of job performance, so that its use in promotion decisions does not
constitute disparate treatment.
As for disparate impact, the subset of training data listed above gives a good
sense of why Hopps also upheld the use of BIs against a disparate impact
challenge. Specifically, within the stipulated subset, the two carnivores have a
mean BI of 150 (the average of 100 for Bert and 200 for Denise), while the two
herbivores have a mean BI of 100 (the average of 50 for Amy and 150 for
Charles). On average, an herbivore scores 50 points lower. To put it another way,
species correlates with BI, so that knowing an officer’s species is sufficient to
predict some (though not all) of her BI. We can assume, as the League asserts,
that this difference primarily reflects a legacy of pre-Hopps discrimination
against herbivores. In many years, this disparity has little or no effect on actual
promotions. A typical promotion threshold is 130, under which Charles (an
herbivore with a BI of 150) and Denise (carnivore, 200) would be promoted
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while Amy (herbivore, 50) and Bert (carnivore, 100) would not. Although BIs
are not evenly distributed across the different populations of officers, there is a
broad range of performance within each population, so the actual promotion
decisions are representatively diverse: one carnivore and one herbivore. In some
years, the disparity in BIs is reflected in disparate promotion rates. In a year
where the promotion threshold is set at 170, the ZPD will promote one carnivore
Denise (200) but no herbivores at all, not even Charles (150).
We held in Hopps that this disparate impact could be justified as a business
necessity, given the comprehensive nature of the Bellwether Index as a measure
of job performance and the lack of good and less discriminatory measures. While
a lower threshold might promote Charles along with Denise, it would also on
average decrease case clearance, civilian satisfaction, and other core police
functions. In our view, Title VII did not require such a tradeoff.
Today, we extend that holding to the use of BIs in decisions pertaining to
hiring as well as to promotion. The strong consensus that the Bellwether Index
is an appropriate measure of job performance in one context makes it an
appropriate target variable in the other. We recognize that there is a difference
between hiring and promotion decisions: applicants are hypothetical apples and
officers are actual oranges. Applicants’ BIs must be predicted, while officers’
BIs can be measured. But any rational hiring process must rest upon some kind
of predictions about future job performance, so prediction is inherent in the
nature of the task. The League has much to say about the difficulties of
prediction, and so will we. We do not believe these arguments go to the target
variable itself. The League accepts that the ZPD may hire new officers with a
view toward their future job performance, and the Bellwether Index remains the
best legally cognizable standard anyone has come up with to define job
performance for an officer of the ZPD.
Other target variables may be problematic to the point of being illegal; this
one is not.
B
But as we said, this is not a case about a target variable. This is a case about
the use of a model to predict a target variable. The considerations applicable are
different in a subtle but significant way.
As a starting point, suppose by way of example that the ZPD had observed
the correlation between species and BI and instituted a blanket policy of hiring
only carnivores. Such a policy would be a per se violation of Title VII. There is
a broad social consensus, reflected in Title VII’s disparate-treatment theory, that
where a prohibited characteristic does no more than point to pre-existing patterns
its use in employment decisions is illegitimate. Even though carnivores are
statistically more successful as ZPD officers as measured by the Bellwether
Index, Title VII forbids projecting that statistical correlation onto individual
applicants on the basis of their species. Given the ugly history of discrimination
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and oppression that has often accompanied them through the centuries, such
characteristics may not be used as proxies for employment criteria, however
strong the correlation. Their use is intrinsically harmful, even if unintentional.
The ZPD asserts that it has done something different: used data mining
algorithms to create a model that enables it to hire on the basis of likely BI, rather
than on the basis of species. The model is indeed predictive of BIs. A 1-point
increase in the model score predicts a 1-point increase in BI Here, the two
officers with model scores of 100 had an average BI of 100; the two officers with
model scores of 150 had an average BI of 150.
The problem is that maybe the ZPD’s model score is successfully
identifying species and only species. The model score is moderately correlated
with BI, to be sure, but it is perfectly correlated with species. The two carnivores
(Bert and Denise) received model scores of 150; the two herbivores (Amy and
Charles) received model scores of 100. Knowing an officer’s model score does
not provide any more information about his or her BI than just knowing his or
her species would. It might be the case that the ZPD’s model is effectively using
all of the data-mined factors to fill in the missing “species” column that Officer
Clawhauser deleted from the personnel files—and then inferring a predicted BI
from an applicant’s species.
Consider another example. Suppose that the ZPD’s model had been based
on a single factor: home address. This would not strictly speaking involve
considering an applicant’s species. Still, home address is highly predictive of
species; tigers and lions do not live in Little Rodentia. A model that gave a score
of 150 to applicants from Tundratown (where Bert the polar bear lives) and from
Outback Island (where Denise the dingo lives) and 100 to all others would
perfectly replicate the scores of ZPD’s actual model on the subset of training
data listed above. It would thus be just as correlated with BI as the actual model
is. To the extent it was predictive of job performance, it would be right for the
wrong reason. Such a model is not actually measuring anything relevant to job
performance; instead, it measures a different but prohibited factor that is itself
correlated with job performance.
The ZPD argues at great length that this is not what it is doing, that its
model really is something other than a proxy for species. We are unconvinced.
We could be convinced. But it will take something more than the evidence
presently in the record. While the ZPD may be trying to predict BIs rather than
species, it has not (yet) shown that it has succeeded in doing so. Unless and until
it does, we believe it has failed to carry its burden of showing that the model it
uses is a genuine business necessity. We will reverse and remand to give the ZPD
an opportunity to make such a showing, on a proper evidentiary record and under
a proper legal standard.
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C
We add a few remarks about arguments the District Court may consider on
remand. The ZPD could rehabilitate its model by showing that the connection
between the target variable and the factors the model relies on is more than just
coincidental or correlational. It could, for example, identify factors with
particularly high weights in the model and explain why those factors
meaningfully relate to an animal’s ability to ably discharge his or her duties as a
sworn officer of the ZPD. Notably, such a showing would go beyond purely
statistical proof; it would require an explanation in terms of the chains of
causation by which one state of affairs in the world leads to another. Sometimes
such explanations come readily to hand: animals who can run faster and for
longer will have an easier time apprehending criminals in hot pursuit. In other
cases, the explanations may be more obscure. We do not currently see how an
officer’s preference among Gazelle songs could causally relate to solving
crimes—but perhaps there is such a connection, and one that the ZPD can
articulate to the District Court on remand. For example, empirically validated
evidence that listening to up-tempo songs causes officers to be more motivated
to exercise, thereby significantly increasing their ability to exert themselves
when needed on the job, would show that musical preferences are not just
predictive but predictive for the right kind of reason. A good explanation of this
sort is one that identifies the hidden and non-discriminatory variables connecting
the observed factors with the predicted target variable. In the previous example,
an officer’s motivation to exercise is the relevant hidden variable. Up-tempo
musical tastes are causally connected to motivation to exercise, which is causally
connected to success in apprehending criminals.
We do not hold that this second type of showing is absolutely required when
a Title VII defendant asserts a business necessity for a data-mined model with a
disparate impact. That said, there are good policy reasons to prefer it. One is
intelligibility; such explanations make black-box algorithms more
comprehensible to those who use them, those who are affected by them, and
those who oversee them.8 Anti-discrimination law is made by animals for the
benefit of animals; algorithmic decision-making must ultimately be accountable
to animals, just as much as animal decision-making is.
Our revised test for business necessity, we hope, will increase this
understanding of how these algorithms work. By shifting the burden of proof to
explain why a hiring model works in cases where that algorithm also has
troubling side effects, the test encourages the party best positioned to understand
the model to understand it.9 The ZPD has full access to the training data, the

8. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (Harvard University Press, 1st ed. 2015).
9. Cf. Kim, supra note 5 (“Similarly, in disparate impact cases courts tend to defer to employer
judgments about what abilities or skills are necessary for a job when evaluating employer justifications
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data-mining algorithms, and the model’s decisions. It should bear the costs of
obscurity—not the applicants whose fates are in the model’s hands but who have
no ability to observe the model’s development or inner workings. And even if
the ZPD fails in developing a convincing explanation, effort devoted to
understanding its model is likely to bear useful fruit. If a model predicts job
performance by way of species because it accurately identifies where animals
live, pinpointing that fact might enable an employer to prune factors that are
predicting job performance for the wrong reasons. Or consider again the musical
tastes example. Perhaps some officers listen to up-tempo music because they are
already motivated to run hard when necessary. Then musical tastes do not cause
job success, but identifying motivation as the connecting causal hidden variable
might allow the ZPD to redesign its model to assess motivation more directly,
thereby coming closer to hiring officers for the right reasons.
Our revised test will also, we hope, encourage parties who use algorithms
to make sensitive decisions to disclose important facts about how those
algorithms work. We place the burden on the ZPD to build a public record
establishing that its algorithms work as described and for the right reasons. The
ZPD introduced a complex data-mined model into its hiring process; if the
progress of public understanding lags behind the progress of technology, the
ZPD is best positioned to close the gap, either by mining less or by explaining
more.
At various stages of this litigation, the ZPD has maintained that it is legally
prohibited from saying more about its model and the data-mining process that
produced it because they are protected personnel records that could reveal
sensitive private information about ZPD officers, and because they are trade
secrets of the private-sector information-technology vendors whose services
Officer Clawhauser and the ZPD have employed. While we respect the ZPD’s
operational needs for confidentiality, we do not believe it is appropriate to shield
algorithms from accountability on these grounds. We will not compel the ZPD
to publicize the inner workings of its hiring algorithms. But unless it is willing
to allow some sunlight into the workings of a model with a disparate impact on
a protected class of animals, we believe it should be from precluded on relying
on the model’s predictive accuracy in defending its conduct. Any other rule
would allow employers to accept the benefits of algorithmic decision-making
while sloughing off the corresponding responsibilities.
D
Our holding today is not without precedent. Other bodies of law require
explanations for why models behave the way they do when making important
decisions. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, for example, requires disclosure of “all

for a practice. However, data mining models often rely on ‘discovered’ relationships between variables,
rather than measuring previously identified job-related skills or attributes.”).
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relevant elements or reasons adversely affecting the credit score for the particular
individual, listed in the order of their importance” when an animal is denied
credit based on a credit score.10 This is a start, but it stops short of requiring that
the factors used by the credit-scoring model need to actually be relevant, rational,
or intelligible. Disclosure that one’s credit score was driven down by the phase
of the moon would suffice—even if that arbitrary choice had catastrophic
consequences for capybaras.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) recognized this gap
in its prescient 1997 guidance on compliance issues posed by credit scoring
models. Those compliance issues include discrimination on the basis of
prohibited characteristics in granting credit; the issues are essentially the same
as in the employment context. The OCC stated that it would conclude that a
variable used in a credit scoring system “is justified by business necessity and
does not warrant further scrutiny if the variable is statistically related to loan
performance, and has an understandable relationship to an individual
applicant’s creditworthiness.” 11 Today, we endorse the OCC’s italicized phrase;
we will not accept an incomprehensible model as a business necessity.
We therefore also reject the suggestion of the Uniform Guidelines on
Employment Selection Procedures that purely statistical analysis can suffice to
establish a model’s validity.12 Two of the three ways that the Guidelines
contemplate validating an employment selection procedure include some kind of
causal explanation. Content validity, in which an applicant is assessed for “a
representative sample of the content of the job,” directly measures the activities
and behaviors that they will perform on the job.13 Here, there is less danger that
the model is serving as a proxy for a prohibited characteristic because the
inferential chain (from doing something well while being assessed to doing the
same thing well while on the job) is too short to include the protected
characteristic. On the other hand, construct validity involves “identifiable
characteristics which have been determined to be important in successful
performance in the job.”14 Here, there is less danger that the model is serving as

10. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f)(2)(B).
11. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Credit Scoring Models, OCC Bull. No. 97-24,
app. 11 (May 20, 1997), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/1997/bulletin-1997-24.html
[https://perma.cc/R6GK-XQNK] (emphasis added). See also National Consumer Law Center, Credit
Discrimination 137 n.116 (6th ed. 2013) (stating that the OCC’s guidance “may be indicative of how
other federal regulators will view this issue.”) We are grateful to amici curiae David Robinson and
Aaron Rieke for drawing our attention to these authorities.
12. See 29 CFR §§ 1607.5(B) (“[A] criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical
data demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or significantly correlated with important
elements of job performance.”), 14(B)(5) (“Generally, a selection procedure is considered related to the
criterion, for the purposes of these guidelines, when the relationship between performance on the
procedure and performance on the criterion measure is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of
significance. . . .”).
13. Id. § 1607.14(C)(1).
14. Id. § 1607.5(B).
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a proxy because those “identifiable characteristics” serve as the missing link in
the inferential chain (from observations about the applicant to the identifiable
characteristics to job performance). In each case, there is a plausible causal story
with a reasonable evidentiary foundation that does not involve a protected
characteristic. With content validity, the causal chain is too short for such
characteristics to sneak in; with construct validity, the chain is longer but
properly connected. Both strike us as sufficient.
E
We close with an observation about the structure of Title VII. Our
modification to the burden-shifting framework of disparate impact borrows from
disparate treatment doctrine. In our view, Title VII does not permit an employer
to do indirectly what it could not do directly. An employer that explicitly selects
applicants on the basis of species violates Title VII under a disparate treatment
theory, regardless of whether species is correlated with job performance, and
regardless of whether it bears animus against particular species. It is the selection
“on the basis of” species that is the problem. An employer that uses home address
to infer applicants’ species and then selects applicants from particular species
does exactly the same, only in two steps rather than one. This too is a form of
disparate treatment. The ZPD’s model is more complex, but if that model selects
applicants based purely on their species, the ZPD is still effectively engaged in
disparate treatment, regardless of whether it realizes that that is how its model
works.15
We regard this indifference to the employer’s knowledge about the inner
workings of a discriminatory model as a virtue of the test we announce today.
We do not want to deter employers from examining closely the models and
algorithms they use. A test that turned only on the employer’s knowledge of how
its model functions would discourage employers from looking too closely at
models that superficially seemed to work. Where a model has a disparate impact,
our test in effect requires an employer to explain why its model is not just a
mathematically sophisticated proxy for a protected characteristic.
We do not regard this as an unreasonable burden on employers. They are
not required to produce such explanations in all cases, but only when (a) they
have delegated their selection procedures to an algorithmically derived model
and (b) that model yields prima facie discriminatory results. An employer that
develops a selection procedure the old-fashioned way, with animalian design and
supervision, can ask the procedure’s designers to explain it. And an employer
that develops a model algorithmically is in the clear if that model does not have
a disparate impact.
15. On the (difficult) relationship between disparate impact and disparate treatment doctrine in
this context, see generally Barocas and Selbst, supra note 1; Kim, supra note 5; George Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2313 (2006).
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III
Our holding today is simple. Incomprehensible discrimination will not
stand. Applicants who are judged and found wanting deserve a better explanation
than, “The computer said so.” Sometimes computers say so for the wrong
reasons—and it is employers’ duty to ensure that they do not.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

